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The 1998 collective bargaining round in Germany was characterised throughout by
three features:
1. The pay bargaining round, accompanied by high hopes on the part of workers, led to
substantially moderate pay settlements which, though higher than in the previous
year, still failed to fully exploit the available room for manoeuvre. The numerous
agreements geared to employment and social policy goals focussed in the main on
improvement of training provision and the arrangements governing part-time work
for elderly workers.
2. The change of government resulting from the elections to the Bundestag on 27 Sep-
tember led not just to certain correctives to earlier measures designed to dismantle
welfare state provision1, but also to a repeat attempt to place the “Alliance for Jobs”
on the agenda, with implications for the collective bargaining process.
3. In the run-up to introduction of the euro at the beginning of 1999, the German trade
unions also paid more attention than in the past to the prospect of the europeanisa-
tion of collective bargaining, their central concern in this respect being to achieve
better coordination of national wage policies with a view to preventing transnational
efforts to use the bargaining process to undercut pay in the effort to improve com-
petitiveness.
After years of moderate pay developments, which invariably represented reductions in
purchasing power, it was intended that the 1998 pay round should rise above mere com-
pensation for inflation. Though the slogan “an end to modesty” (“Ende zur Bescheiden-
heit”) launched by IG Metall leader Klaus Zwickel set the tone for the whole round, the
results fell very far short of expectations, in spite of favourable developments in the
economy at large. For 1998 the economic research institutes had forecast real economic
growth of 2.8% – as against 2.2% in 1997 and 1.4% in 1996 – while corporate profits
had in many cases continued to show significant improvement in 1997. Another
undoubtedly positive factor was that conduct of the pay round was not affected by other
bargaining disputes running in parallel, as had been the case in 1997 with the contro-
versy over sickness pay.
Initial pacesetting for the 1998 bargaining round was established very early on because,
in a number of sectors (including banking, insurance and steel), by the summer of 1997
the two sides of industry had reached settlements that were to run to the end of 1998 and
in some cases beyond (see Table 1). In addition, the 1997 round comprised a certain
number of two-year agreements that included phased increases for 1998 and which also
operated to some extent as pacesetters (engineering, textiles and clothing). In the 1998
round proper, the public service agreement was one of the first to be concluded. Here,
after a difficult arbitration procedure, the ÖTV settled for a 1.5% pay increase to run for
12 months. There can be no doubt that this modest settlement – measured against the
overall economic situation – had a dampening effect on subsequent bargaining in other
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7sectors; even so, in the end this agreement did not set the trend for others because the
economic situation in some sectors was simply too good. This applies in particular to
the flourishing west German chemicals industry where IG BCE secured a 3%2 increase.
All in all the range of pay settlements was significantly broader than in previous years.
In east Germany the process of equalisation of pay with western levels continued to
make some progress. Over the last year pay levels in some sectors were raised in a
series of small steps to the western levels. As a result the overall east/west pay ratio is
now 90.8%.
The controversy over the further development of the regional sectoral collective agree-
ment (Flächenvertrag), waged in recent years, particularly in the engineering sector,
calmed down to some extent. In March 1998 the employers’ organisation Gesamtmetall
made IG Metall an offer for a “new partnership” and a summit meeting between the two
organisations was held on 30 September. In September, well in advance of the 1999
bargaining round, an agreement was reached between the two sides that the bargaining
results in western Germany would be taken over by the east German sector. Meanwhile,
the trend towards differentiation and decentralisation of collective bargaining proce-
dures and gains continued. Large numbers of multi-employer or company-level agree-
ments either renewed hardship, opening or differentiation clauses or introduced such
clauses for the first time. However, the actual content of such agreements and the mode
of settlement continue to display considerable variety and the real significance of such
provisions in industrial and workplace relations practice ranges between a symbolic
policy stance and regular use.3 It is to be noted also that in a growing number of cases it
is the trade unions which succeed in securing respect for collectively agreed provisions
and the renewal of the corresponding agreements. Amendments and company-level
agreements clearly have an important role to play here.
The coalition agreement between the SPD and Alliance 90/Greens gave prominence to a
new “Alliance for jobs and training”. A statement issued after the first meeting on 7
December included the following commitment:
´7KHUH# LV# D#QHHG# IRU# HIIHFWLYH# FRQWULEXWLRQV# IURP# WKH# VWDWH/# IURP
WKH# FRUSRUDWH# VHFWRU# DQG# IURP# WKH# WUDGH# XQLRQV/# DV#ZHOO# DV# IRU
UHVWUDLQW#E\#WKH#VRFLDO#SDUWQHUV1#,W#KDV#EHHQ# MRLQWO\#DFFHSWHG#WKDW
DFWLRQV# DJUHHG# EHWZHHQ# SDUWLHV# WR# WKH# DOOLDQFH# ²# H1J1# WKH# VRFLDO
SDUWQHUV#DQG#WKH#JRYHUQPHQW#²#ZLOO#EH#GLUHFWHG#WRZDUGV#WKH#JRDOV
RI#WKH#$OOLDQFH#DQG#ZLOO#VXSSRUW#WKH#DJUHHPHQWV#FRQFOXGHG#LQ#WKLV
FRQWH[W1µ
Any practical consequences entailed by this statement for the 1999 bargaining round
remained a matter of controversy among participants, and even within the trade unions
opinions tend to diverge.
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2.1. Pay
Table 1 : Selected pay agreements in east and west for 1998
Date
concluded
Sector Pay settlement for 1998
Increase As from for how long
Agreements from 1996/97 including (phased) pay increases for 1998
12/96-3/97 Metal industry West and East 2,5 % 1.4.98 for 9 months
09.01.97 Woodworking Westphalia 1,7 % 1.4.98 for 12 months
17.01.97 Textile and clothing West 2,1 % 1.7.98 for 11/10 months
28.05.97 Banking West 2,0 % 1.12.97 for 13 months
24.06.97 Volkswagen AG 2,5 % 1.8.98 for 12 months
04.07.97 Insurance West 2,0 % 1.12.97 for 13 months
20.10.97 Steel industry NRW, Lower Saxony,
Bremen
2,6 % 1.3.98 for 12 months
Agreements 1998
08.01.98 Steel industry East 2.6 % 1.1.98 for 13 months
10.02.98 Motor industry NRW 2.4 % 1.3.98 for 12 months
20.03.98 Motor industry Saxony 1.3/0.8 % After 3  zero months
1.4.98/1.1.99
16.03.98 Textile industry East 2.25/1.0 % 1.3./1.11.98
27.03.98 Public services 1.5 % 1.1.98 for 12 months
25.06.98 Energy and public utility sector
(AVEU) East
1.75 % 1 1.5.98 for 12 months
04.05.98 Foreign trade Bavaria 2.5 % After 2 zero months
1.5.98 for 11 months
09.05.98 Chemicals West 2.4 % 2 1.3.98 3 for 14 months
16.04.98 Construction industry West 1.5 % 1.4.98 for 12 months
13.05.98 Printing industry West and East 2.0 % 1.4.98 for 12 months
17.05.98 Deutsche Bahn AG West and East 1.5 %  4 After 1  zero month
1.6.98 for 11 months
20.05.98 Construction industry East 1.5 % 1.10.98 for 6 months
10.06.98 Rubber industry West
                              East
2.0 % 5
3.0 %
1.7.98 for 12 months
1.11.98 for 14 months
17.06.98 Paper processing West 1.75 %  6 After 6 zero months
1.10.98 for 6 months
22.06.98 Retail trade Bavaria 2.1–2.5 % After 2 zero months
1.7.98 for 10 months
22.06.98 Foreign trade Saxony-Anhalt 2.5 % After 2 zero months
1.7.98 for 10 months
21.08.98 Rhine coal industry 1.4 % After 2 zero months
1.9.98 for 12 months
02.09.98 Hotels and catering Bavaria 1.8 % 7 1.9.98 for 7 months
01.12.98 Chemical Industry East 3.7/2.3 % 8 1.1.99/1.1.00 for 6 months
1 125 DM a month for 3 and 4/98.
2 Additional one-off payment of 1.1 % of annual pay.
3 In individual regions as from 1.4. and 1.5.
4 East: from 86 to 87 or 88 % as from 1/99 or 1/00.
5 Additional single payment of 12 % of monthly pay.
6 Plus pay adjustment for 1-hour working time reduction as from 1.4.98.
7 200 DM single payment for 4 to 8/98.
8 Single payment of 60 DM for each of 10 and 11/98.
Source: WSI collective bargaining archive 1998
9The DGB trade unions concluded, over Germany as a whole, pay agreements covering a
total of 13.2 million employees, 10.8 million of them in the old and 2.4 million in the
new Bundesländer. For a further 5 million employees, increases agreed in 1997 or even
earlier now came into force. Some 2.2 employees whose pay agreements expired in
1998 had not (yet) had them renewed by the end of the year.
The average rate of settlement – in the old Bundesländer4 – was 1.9%. This figure does
not include various forms of one-off payment, but it does include increases taking effect
later than 1998. If account is taken only of the increases coming into effect in 1998, the
average rate of settlement becomes 1.8%.5  Actual figures range between 1.5% in the
building trade, financial services and public services and 2.4% in the trading sector.
In 1998 “zero months” once again played a significant role in collective agreements.
Some 5.2 million employees – i.e. just half of those covered by new agreements –
suffered delays in the implementation of settlements. Some 35% had to wait for 1-2
months and 12% for 3-6 months before receiving the agreed regular pay increase. By
way of compensation for the delays, the trade unions negotiated special payments on
behalf of about a quarter of these workers, amounting to an average of DM 67 a month.
The average duration of the pay agreements in the old Länder is slightly more than a
year (12.7 months), significantly shorter than in the previous rounds (1997: 16.8 and
1996: 16.2 months). For 9.7 million workers (81.3%) the agreements run for one year,
for 1.3 million (12.4%) for 13-14 months, while the rest are of varying durations.
A more useful figure than the rate of settlement is the annual collectively agreed pay
increase, since this can more easily be compared with other economic data (e.g. prices,
productivity). Calculation of this indicator involves adjusting the rate of settlement
figures in the light of the duration of the agreement, which rarely overlaps precisely
with the calendar year, and also taking account of any increases resulting from agree-
ments concluded in earlier years and any special payments negotiated to compensate for
delays in the implementation of settlements. The average annual pay increase thus cal-
culated, i.e. increase in 1998 as against 1997, amounted to 1.8% for Germany as a
whole. The highest annual increase was 2.3% in the trading sector and the lowest was
1.3% in the building trade. Average rates were 1.7% for western Germany and 2.5% for
eastern Germany. The figures for 1997 were 2.7% (east) and 1.4% (west).
7DEOH#5#=#$QQXDO#FROOHFWLYHO\#DJUHHG#SD\#LQFUHDVHV#IRU#4<<;#4
Sector East West Total
WF % WF % WF %
Horticulture, agriculture and forestry 102 2,5 105 1,7 207 2,0
Energy and water supply, mining 73 2,6 244 1,2 317 1,5
Raw materials and capital goods 74 2,2 1.006 2,0 1.080 2,1
Investment goods energy 405 1,8 4.060 1,8 4.465 1,8
Consumer goods industry 134 2,1 1.145 1,5 1.279 1,6
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:Food and tobacco industry 40 5,9 530 1,7 570 2,0
Building trade 426 0,8 1.032 1,5 1.458 1,3
Wholesale and retail trade 488 3,7 2.805 2,0 3.293 2,3
Transport and communications 186 4,3 921 1,5 1.107 2,0
Banking and insurance 53 3,1 649 1,4 702 1,5
Private services to businesses 332 1,6 1.396 1,5 1.728 1,5
Local authorities and social security 820 2,9 2.280 1,5 3.100 1,9
Whole economy 3.133 2,5 16.173 1,7 19.306 1,8
1 Annual increase in 1998 as compared with 1997. Size of workforce covered (WF) in 1000.
Source: WSI collective bargaining archive 1998
The stage reached in the approximation of agreed wages to the western German level
can be demonstrated first of all by the trend in agreed basic pay. Taking 31.12.1998 as
the reference date, the following picture emerges on the basis of the selected core sec-
tors (see chart below): the top groups with 100% (for some time already virtually
unchanged) are the iron and steel industry, engineering, printing, building cleaning
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xxo
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1 average western pay
2 wage only
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Situation 31.12.98
Collective bargaining archive 1999
Deutsche Bahn AG
;industry Berlin, paper processing (waged workers 99.6%), insurance and banking. Way
ahead are also the confectionery industry (98.8%), retail trade (97%), the building trade
(93.8%) and wholesale trade (waged 95.9%, salaried 91.7%.) A considerable number of
sectors lie somewhere between 80 and 90%, including public services (86.5%), the
chemicals industry (81.8%), the brown coal and gas industry (81.8%). In the lower third
of the list are sectors such as hotel and catering in Saxony (76.4%), textile industry
(wages 78.5%), private transport Saxony (wages70.1%) and agriculture in Mecklen-
burg-Vorpommern (69.4%).
In some sectors further pay increases have already been agreed for 1999 in the frame-
work of the phased plans. In the chemicals industry pay levels rise at the beginning of
the year to 84.8%; in the woodworking industry in Saxony they rise on 1 April to 92.4%
(wages) and 77% (salaries). In retail trading wages and salaries rise to 100% (as from 1
April). The railways (Deutsche Bahn AG) raise pay at the beginning of 1999 to 87%,
the post office (Deutsche Post AG) to 90%6 and telecom (Deutsche Telekom AG) to
100% (from October 1999).
Taking 31 December 1998 as the reference date, the average rate of equalisation in the
22 bargaining sectors or branches is 90.8%. At the end of 1997 the east/west ratio was
89.8%; at the end of 1996 88.7%; at the end of 1995 86%. These figures do not take into
account the extent to which the agreed pay provisions are actually observed.
Contrary to what was expected a year earlier, the average annual increase in collectively
agreed pay for Germany as a whole in 1998, 1.8%, is higher than the inflation rate of
1%. Accordingly, trade union collective bargaining policy was successful in achieving
more than keeping pace with the rising cost of living. Even so, the full room for
manoeuvre – consisting of price increases (0.9%) plus productivity increases (2.8%)
totalling 3.7% – was once more far from exhausted.
Looking at actual pay developments in Germany as a whole, the following picture
emerges: the gross pay bill per worker increased in 1998 by 1.6%; adjusted to take
account of rising prices, the increase was 0.7%. The net pay bill grew at a nominal rate
of 1.5%. The real net income per worker increased by 0.6% in the last year. Given the
significant productivity gains (2.8%), unit labour costs fell by 1.3% and in eastern
Germany by 1.8%.
Table 3 : Income distribution, Productivity und unit labour costs in 1998
- Percentage change in comparison with previous year -
Total West East
Gross pay bill per worker 1.6 1.6 1.4
Net pay bill per worker 1.5 1.4 2.2
Real pay bill per worker 0.7 0.7 0.5
Real net pay per worker 0.6 0.5 1.0
Labour productivity per worker 2.8 2.8 2.5
Unit labour costs -1.3 -1.1 -1.8
Source: Federal Statistical Office
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<2.2 Working time
In terms of collectively agreed weekly working time there was little change on the vir-
tual standstill recorded also in the previous year. Average weekly working time in 1998
in Germany as a whole was 37.7 hours (West 37.4 and East 39.2). At the end of 1998
17.9% of collectively covered workers in Germany had a working week of 35 hours,
52% of between 37 and 38.5 hours and 15.4% of 39 hours. That leaves 11.3% with a
working week of 40 hours or more (see Table 4 below).
Table 4 : Average collectively agreed working time in 1998
Collectively agreed provision East West Total
Weekly working time (hours) 39.2 37.4 37.7
Percentage of workers (in %)  with:
35 - 21.9 17.9
36 – 37 5.1 12.5 11.1
37.5 - 38.5 26.5 47.9 44.1
39 – 40 and more hours 68.3 17.6 26.7
Days off 1.4 2.1 1.9
Holiday (working days) 1 28.3 29.2 29.1
Annual working time (hours) 1,735.5 1,643.2 1,659.5
1 Average holiday entitlement
Source: WSI collective bargaining archive Situation: 31.12.1998
At the end of 1998 some 3.7 million employees in Germany had benefited from a
working time reduction in the form of 1.9 days off. This form of working time reduction
is particularly widespread in some sectors, e.g. energy and water supply, mining and
transport and communications.
Average holiday entitlement in Germany as a whole is 29.1 days (west 29.2 and east
28.3). Basic entitlement varies between 24.4 days in horticulture, agriculture and for-
estry and 30 days in banking and insurance.  Total holiday entitlement ranges between
27.9 and 30.1 days, with an average of 30.0 days.
If collectively agreed annual working time is computed on the basis of these and other
components, the average for Germany as a whole is 1,659.5 hours, for western Germany
1,643.2 hours and for eastern Germany 1,735.5 hours.
In terms of equalisation of other collectively agreed entitlements and gains (e.g. holiday
and Christmas pay, profit related bonuses), some progress has been made on a number
of different points.
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Public discussion about recent collective bargaining trends has focused predominantly
on the signs of crisis and tendency towards erosion displayed by the established system.
Failure to respect collectively agreed provisions and a reluctance to retain membership
of federations and engage in bargaining are rife. Even so, it should not be overlooked
that, all the unmistakable signs of crisis notwithstanding, regulation by means of multi-
employer or regional collective agreement remains the overwhelmingly prevalent
approach to the fixing of working and pay conditions in the Federal Republic. The
figures to emerge from the survey of companies conducted by the Labour Market and
Occupational Research Institute (IAB) show this quite unequivocally. In western Ger-
many in 1998 47.7% of workplaces and 67.8% of workers were covered by a sectoral
pay agreement. For eastern Germany the figure was 25.8% of workers and 50.5% of
employees. Actual levels differ significantly from one sector to another. Additional
coverage is provided by company-level agreements (in western Germany for 4.8% of
workplaces and 8% of employees and in eastern Germany for 7.6% of workplaces and
12.7% of employees)(see Table 5).
Even if for western Germany taken as a whole a regressive trend is observable7, there
are counter-movements. In many – and in some cases important – individual instances,
the trade unions have also successfully managed to secure and extend collective bar-
gaining guarantees. In other cases the controversy has so far led to no outcome. The
following examples illustrate the diversity of procedures and results.
Table 5 : Trends in collectively agreed regional coverage of workplaces and
employees
Sector West Germany East Germany
1995 1998 1996 1998
Compa-
nies
Employ-
ees
Compa-
nies
Employ-
ees
Compa-
nies
Employ-
ees
Compa-
nies
Employ-
ees.
Agriculture 44.6 65.0 48.6 71.6 13.7 29.3 24.9 24.3
Mining/Energy 89.3 81.5 62.6 76.4 63.6 90.2 58.1 87.3
Processing of raw
materials
61.4 80.2 51.0 75.2 21.7 50.6 24.4 48.8
Capital goods 58.8 81.0 60.3 74.0 34.7 49.5 27.8 40.0
Consumer goods 68.7 79.1 60.4 75.9 37.4 50.1 32.2 38.2
Building trade 79.3 91.0 70.6 83.0 38.9 52.1 39.5 50.3
Wholesale and retail
trade
52.7 70.8 48.5 64.6 23.0 45.8 19.0 40.7
Transport/Communi-
cations
54.9 54.3 32.6 52.5 26.2 47.0 28.2 39.3
Banks/Insurance 68.8 91.2 62.2 85.5 49.2 90.6 66.0 90.0
Other services 40.5 57.8 37.2 55.2 17.4 51.2 15.5 45.6
Non-profit-making
organisations
50.3 63.7 39.6 57.1 44.0 45.8 36.2 39.8
Local authorities/
Social insurance
88.1 88.6 76.4 88.7 94.7 92.1 90.9 90.0
Total 53.4 72.2 47.7 67.8 27.6 56.2 25.8 50.5
Source: IAB-Betriebspanel, 3. Welle West 1995, 1. Welle Ost 1996, 6. Welle West/3. Welle Ost 1998.
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¾ Ravensburger AG
The toy manufacturer Ravensburger AG introduced, in May 1997, an “alliance to
strengthen competitiveness and secure the production location”. This  involved – in
contravention of the collective agreement – an unpaid two-hour increase in weekly
working time from 36 to 38 hours. After individual questioning by supervisors, 90% of
the workforce voted in favour of this arrangement. Soon afterwards the company left the
employers’ federation. In the works council elections held in the following spring, IG
Medien managed, after intensive preliminary canvassing, to win 7 out of 15 seats on the
works council. The union then summoned the company to engage in collective bar-
gaining procedures, and in May 1998, just before the workplace collective bargaining
committee was due to be elected, offered to the company the conclusion of a company
agreement in which it (once again) recognised the regional agreement for the paper
industry.
¾ German airport companies
In compliance with EU legislation the ground services at airports, previously the exclu-
sive preserve of the airport authorities, have been opened up to tender from other sup-
pliers.8 Since the beginning of 1998 handling services may be supplied by the airport
companies and since the beginning of 1999 they may also be sub-contracted. This has
brought rates of pay for airport employees under considerable pressure. After several
rounds of bargaining on behalf of employees in the German airport companies, who
were covered by the agreement for the public services, the ÖTV and the employers’ side
concluded an agreement on employment guarantees and preservation of competitive-
ness. Basically it contains provision for opening clauses which become effective only
subject to the conclusion of additional local agreements.
¾ Sinitec
In May 1997 it became known that Siemens-Nixdorf AG planned to hive off services, to
shed its commitment to collective agreements and, having done so, to extend working
hours from 35 to 40 a week, among other changes. After protracted negotiation –
accompanied by demonstrations, national action days and token strikes by the em-
ployees concerned – in June 1998 IG Metall succeeded in concluding with the regional
employers’ federations an additional collective agreement preserving collectively
agreed coverage for all (hived off) Sinitec companies. Its provisions include a 37-hour
week (diverging from the multi-employer agreement) and a guarantee of no redundan-
cies for the period of the agreement until October 2001. Before the agreement runs out,
talks are to be conducted to ascertain whether working time can be adjusted to comply
with the framework agreement for the engineering industry.9
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¾ debis
After months of negotiations IG Metall concluded with the employers’ federations and
debis AG, a subsidiary of Daimler Chrysler, an additional collective agreement which
extends collective bargaining coverage from 2,400 to some 5,000 employees. The
agreement guarantees previously covered workers and also regular shiftworkers a 35-
hour week. Other workers have a 40-hour week.10 Pay is based on an annual target
salary which is dependent, among other things, on an assessment of performance and
achievement of planned output. The agreement also includes provisions covering further
training, protection against dismissal and income security.
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In relation to the introduction of the euro an intensive discussion has taken place over
the last year among the European trade unions concerning the possible nature of a Euro-
pean perspective on the hitherto strictly national collective bargaining policies.11 Since
introduction of the euro will do away with the possibility of the buffer function per-
formed by exchange rate adjustments, the pressure on national labour and pay standards
will increase. The obvious conclusion is that without cross-border coordination of pay
bargaining, it will be impossible to prevent competitive undercutting in pay policy.
Already in the 1980s a fundamental change in the collective bargaining paradigm could
be observed virtually everywhere in Europe. This change could be described as the tran-
sition from a collective bargaining policy geared to productivity to one geared to com-
petition. Since then the European trade unions have succeeded in rare instances only in
exhausting the “cost-neutral” room for manoeuvre resulting from productivity gains.
The result has been a massive shift in distribution from labour to capital income and a
general reduction in the share of wages in GDP. German collective bargaining policy is
no exception to this picture. The long-term development of unit labour costs in
Germany is, on the contrary, far lower than the average for the other industrialised
countries.
In this situation, the recent trade union initiatives designed to achieve close European
coordination of national collective bargaining policies are of the utmost importance.
One of the most significant examples is the cooperation among the Belgian, German,
Luxembourg and Dutch trade unions which found expression in the “Doorn declara-
tion”.12 On 4 and 5 September 1998 leading representatives of the confederations and
sectoral unions from these countries met in Doorn in the Netherlands to discuss the
future prospects for and background to collective bargaining after introduction of the
euro and the possibilities for closer cooperation. The resulting “Doorn declaration”
contains the first concrete points of guidance for a transnational coordination of collec-
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tive bargaining policy. The trade unions involved aimed for collectively agreed pay
gains corresponding to the sum of price developments and growth in labour produc-
tivity. This was a way of simultaneously seeking a strengthening of overall purchasing
power and job preservation measures (e.g. by working time reductions). The formula is
intended to give clear guidance on the appropriate level of pay increase, in a manner
flexible enough to allow for differences between countries, the goal being to forestall,
among the countries concerned, the employers’ wish to achieve competitive undercut-
ting of collectively agreed rates of pay. This pay policy coordination can be viewed as a
step on the path to European cooperation in the collective bargaining area. It thus pro-
vides, for the first time in this form, a yardstick that can serve as the basis for a
systematic discussion of the cross-border effects of national pay policies. How such a
first step can be taken further is shown by the example of the European Metalworkers’
Federation (EMF).
Ever since the 1970s the EMF has been reiterating the need for a coordination of
national collective bargaining policies. In 1993 it formulated its discussions and activi-
ties for the first time in a fundamental collective bargaining statement and in 1995
decided on a first series of measures to implement its coordination (including develop-
ment of an information system on collective bargaining developments, regular meetings
of tax experts, involvement of foreign trade unionists in national collective bargaining,
synchronisation of national collective bargaining, development of European campaigns
on specific topics).13 In its collective bargaining policy guidelines of 1996 binding
regulations were decided for the areas of pay and working time, providing for example
that member organisations faced with reductions in real earnings in three consecutive
years must report to the EMF. In its working time charter of June 1998 it formulated a
European minimum standard with a maximum annual limit on working time of 1750
hours. Finally, at its 3rd collective bargaining conference held in Frankfurt in December
1998, the EMF adopted a “European coordination rule” according to which all metal-
workers’ unions in Europe undertake to make compensation for inflation and the equal
participation of workers’ income in productivity gains into a collective bargaining
policy guideline.14
An important instrument for implementation of this coordination rule is meant to be the
further development of cross-border collective bargaining partnerships at regional level.
A current example of such cross-border collective bargaining cooperation is the
cooperation between IG Metall in North Rhine Westphalia and the Dutch and Belgian
metalworkers’ unions.15  All together it is quite evident that in this three-country region
communication and cooperation between the metalworkers’ unions has increased in
volume and intensity. This corresponds to the underlying philosophy contained in the
EMF coordination rule, which thus represents an attempt to broaden the foundation for
joint collective bargaining positions and to give their practical implementation a more
binding character.
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The 1990s brought the most overwhelming changes to collective bargaining policy
since the war. The unification of the two Germanies and the ensuing process of trans-
formation of the new Länder faced the trade unions and their collective bargaining
policy with major challenges with which they have not yet come fully to grips. The end
of the unification boom plunged the (western) German economy into its hitherto deepest
recession, bringing in its wake a further dramatic rise in unemployment. This collapse
took place simultaneously with the continuous process of an increasing internationalisa-
tion of the economy and globalisation of competition. At company level the continuing
collapse of labour, production and organisation systems led to an intensification of the
process of rationalisation with contradictory consequences for the working conditions of
employees and the terms of action open to their representatives at company level. The
deregulatory policies conducted by the Conservative/Liberal federal government were
the final nail in the  coffin where opportunities for successful collective bargaining
policy were concerned.
Pay policy in the 1990s shows a contrasting outcome: though the trade unions in the old
Länder proved able, in a prospering economy, to win significant increases in real pay,
the onset of crisis led to a “turnabout” in collective bargaining policy for which the
employers’ federations had long wished.
1993 saw the deepest recession of the post-war period in the (old) Bundesländer. The
economy shrunk, GDP was 1.9% down on the previous year, leading to drastic shedding
of workers in nearly all sectors of the economy, with the numbers of registered unem-
ployed rising to more than 2.5 million, more than half a million more than a year earlier.
The depth of the recession, which made the collective bargaining conditions ever more
difficult for the trade unions, was compounded by growing political pressure on the
parties to collective bargaining (i.e. the trade unions) to take account of the difficult
situation by concluding “moderate” pay agreements. This was also connected with the
controversy at the beginning of 1993 over the “solidarity pact”, by means of which the
federal government wished to commit all social groups to the idea of developing eastern
Germany and restoring the state finances to better health. Though the trade unions
attempted to extricate the collective bargaining process from involvement in such an
approach, the political discussion did not fail to exert an influence on public opinion and
workers’ expectations. As the gravity of the economic recession was gradually recog-
nised, there developed also a new discussion about Germany’s viability as a production
site, which on the employers’ side was conducted almost exclusively in terms of argu-
ments about labour costs. They attempted to account principally for the “costs crisis” of
the German economy by reference to the steep rises in unit labour costs since the begin-
ning of the 90s. All in all, 1993 showed a declining collective bargaining curve. In the
economy as a whole and on an annual average real pay levels were not secured by col-
lective agreements.
The 1994 collective bargaining round one again took place, in the old Bundesländer,
under the continuing impact of the deepest recession in the post-war period. It is true
that in the course of the year the economy underwent a sudden unexpected upturn, but
on the labour market the negative developments continued. On annual average the un-
employment figure was up 300,000 on the previous year. Therefore the trade unions’
collective bargaining policy was conducted under growing pressure not from the
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employers alone but from broader sections of political opinion. The demand was for a
policy geared to pay restraint, with productivity developments representing the upper
limit. The employers’ campaign for a turnabout in collective bargaining gathered
momentum. Indeed, for the first time the employers openly demanded a reduction in
agreed pay levels. Unlike in the previous year the employers’ federations linked their
demands to the question of principle concerning continuation of the collective bar-
gaining system. Only if, with the help of cost reductions, it proved possible to curb the
allegedly dramatic deterioration of the competitive position of companies and, by means
of flexibility (of working time in particular), to give individual companies more free-
dom of action and room for manoeuvre, did the regional collective agreement – so the
employers’ argument went – have any enduring chance of survival.
As a result of this configuration, in 1994 the trade unions were compelled to accept
collective agreements which in previous rounds would have been deemed completely
unacceptable. Rates of settlement significantly below inflation, widespread freezing or
reduction of collectively agreed special annual bonuses, renegotiation – and in some
cases deterioration – of working time arrangements (still in force!) are concessions that
become understandable only in the light of the hopelessly defensive position in which
the trade unions found themselves at the end of 1993/beginning 1994. That they also
managed to secure some gains, particularly in relation to job preservation, lightens the
gloom somewhat but is not enough to make the very mixed collective bargaining out-
come into a positive sign of collective bargaining policy reform and influence.
Whereas in 1995 the employers hoped to continue along their – from their own point of
view – successful course, the expectation of employees and trade unions after three lean
pay years was rather different.  From these extremely different attitudes and expecta-
tions on the two sides of industry there emerged one of the most conflictual bargaining
rounds in recent years. After an 11-day strike in the Bavarian engineering industry at the
end of February and beginning of March, IG Metall achieved a collective agreement in
the metalworking industry which, in terms of volume, was once more, for the first time,
significantly above the rate of inflation. After one-off payments for the first four
months, there was a 3.4% increase from May and further 3.6% from November 1995 to
run to the end of 1996. This agreement represented an important pacesetter for other
sectors too. Instances of industrial action in a number of other bargaining sectors
showed that employees in both the old and the new Länder were prepared to put up a
fight. This palpable renaissance of strikes for higher pay, which many observers had
already written off as an antiquated instrument for the settlement of disputes, not only
led to some very tangible results but undoubtedly also represented a gain for the trade
unions in terms of credibility and ability to push through their demands. In the
employers’ camp, however, the engineering agreement unleashed a violent discussion
and wave of internal remonstrations. The actual conduct of the bargaining in question,
but also the collective bargaining system as a whole, were in the line of fire of increas-
ingly radical criticism from economic, political and academic commentators.
At the end of 1995 IG Metall president Klaus Zwickel issued his proposal – initially
aimed at the engineering industry – for an “employment alliance” which offered
employers a policy of pay restraint in return for guarantees that no workers would be
made redundant and that 300,000 jobs would be created. Although this rapidly turned
into a political initiative launched by the trade union movement as a whole in the direc-
tion of the government, it then promptly foundered on the unwillingness of both the
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government and the corporate sector to become involved in a concept of cooperative
action to combat unemployment. The collective bargaining and social climate hardened,
as evidenced by the dispute in the autumn of 1996 over the cut in the 100 per cent
statutory sickness pay. Results of the 1996 pay round were very modest with settlement
rates of 1.5 to 2%.
1997 was marked by a persistent and increasingly acute employment crisis. On the col-
lective bargaining front, the (successful) campaign to preserve sickness pay was in the
forefront of concerns. In return a number of pay and collective bargaining compromises
had to be made, the outcome of which was another round of low pay settlements. Over
the economy as a whole, for the first time in many years, pay developments fell behind
the rise in the cost of living. Yet the resulting demand for “an end to modesty” issued by
the IG Metall chairman were unable to be translated into pay bargaining reality in 1998.
The ratio of pay to GDP fell to an all-time low.
Against this background, a distribution policy balance sheet of the 90s hardly looks very
positive. Workers’ income in the 1990s rose 8% less than labour productivity and con-
sumer prices. Gross per capita income per worker in Germany (west and east) between
1991 and 1998 rose by 31.4%, while the (cost neutral) room for distribution (produc-
tivity plus prices) rose, during the same period, by 39.2% (see chart below). This
moderate income development did not, however, pay off in policy terms: the volume of
labour in the economy as a whole fell by 8% in the period 1991-98, from 50.4 billion to
46.2 billion hours.
The policy of pay restraint conducted since the 1992-93 recession accordingly did not
represent a strategic element of trade union policy but was substantially attributable to
the economic recession and the associated much weakened ability of the trade unions to
push through their claims. The only successes gained by the unions during this period
were in the field of employment preservation. Thus in the 1994 bargaining round
agreements were for the first time concluded in several sectors allowing the possibility
of a reduction of agreed working hours (for a fixed term) although this was not achieved
without some loss of pay (in certain cases less than proportionate). In return, companies
were required to guarantee that there would be no redundancies. In the autumn of 1993
IG Metall and Volkswagen agreed on the company-wide introduction of the four-day
week (28.8 hours), albeit accompanied by a corresponding drop in earnings. In recent
years there were many more instances of such agreements which also spread to other
sectors.
4:
Productivity, prices and income developments 1991 - 1998 in Germany
(Index 1991 = 100)
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The 1999 round represented a significant turning point in collective bargaining
developments. For the first time in many years it brought agreements that were in all
cases significantly above the inflation rate and in most cases also came close to fully
exploiting the productivity-linked room for manoeuvre (see Table 6).
The 1999 collective bargaining round differed from its predecessors in many respects.
Thus, once again, but differently from in 1998, the engineering industry played a lead-
ing role because the pay agreements ran out at the end of the year and the negotiations
had begun in December 1998. Then there were the banking and insurance and public
services whose agreements also ran out at the end of 1998. These were followed at the
end of February by the west German steel industry and, a month later, the building
trade, the printing industry, part of wholesale and retail trading and a series of further
bargaining sectors. In the chemicals industry the agreements expired at the end of April
or May.
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Table 6 : Selected pay agreements in West and East for 1999
Date Sector Terms of pay agreement for 1999
Increase Date implemented and
duration
One-off payments
01.12.98 Chemicals industry East 3.7 % 1.1.99 for 12 months
18.02.99 Metal industry Bad.-Württemberg
Pilot agreement
3.2 % 1.3.99 for 12 months 350 DM for January
and February 1999 1
25.02.99 Automobile trade NRW 3.0 % 1.3.99 for 12 months
27.02.99 Public service 3.1 % 1.4.99 for 12 months 300 DM (West),
259,50 DM (East)
f. Jan. – March 1999
19.03.99 Iron and steel industry Lower
Saxony, Bremen, North Rhine-
Westphalia
3.3 % 1.6.99 for 12 months 500 DM for March
to May 1999
19./20.03.99 Insurance trade 3.2 % 1.4.99 for 12 months 350 DM for January
to March 1999
30./31.03.99 Energy supply industry North Rhine
Westphalia
3.1 % 1.6.99 for 12 months 350 DM for April
and May 1999
13.04.99 Confectionery industry 3.0 % 1.4.99 for 12 months
21./22.04.99 Building trade 2.9 % 1.4.99 for 12 months
06.05.99 Printing industry 3.3 % 1.4.99 for 12 months
01.06.99 Chemicals industry North Rhine
Pilot agreement for West Germany
3.0 % 1.6.99 for 12 months 200 DM for May
1999
1 additional one-off payment of 1 % of annual pay.
Source: WSI collective bargaining archive 1999
In the major collective bargaining sectors the trade unions’ pay demands ranged
between 5.5% (ÖTV) and 6.5% (IG Metall, HBV). For the building sector IG BAU has
already announced a lower claim, not least because there are also other matters on the
bargaining agenda (e.g. bad weather payments, pension questions). The ambitious
claims put forward, for example by IG Metall, are also based on the explicit argument
that after the lean bargaining results of earlier years, which led to perceptible drops in
purchasing power, the prospective room for distribution of 1999 should not simply be
used up but also that the missed opportunities for distributive gains in past years should
be at least partially made good.16
The engineering employers did not only – as expected – reject these demands out of
hand, but they made it clear, at the same time, that they were aiming for a new differen-
tiated structure for a collective agreement. They want to agree, alongside percentage pay
increases for all workers, a one-off payment which at company level, with the consent
of the works councils, can be reduced or not paid at all.17 In addition, the amount of the
Xmas bonus is to be linked to the profit situation of the company. IG Metall rejected
such ideas from the outset because in this way the basic function of regional collective
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agreements, namely to define uniform pay levels for the whole pay sector, would be
gradually eroded. After a major token strike IG Metall reached agreement in mid-April.
This year’s collective bargaining round was significantly complicated by the fact that it
was overshadowed by the parallel talks between government, workers and trade unions
on an alliance for jobs. While the employers demanded that pay policy questions should
be included in the talks for an alliance, the majority of the trade union representatives
rejected this demand and the 1999 collective bargaining round was in fact conducted
without pay policy being discussed in the talks for the alliance. Pay increases in most
sectors were between 3 and 3.3% and the duration of agreements was between 12 and
15 months.
